
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# National Intelligence Bulletin

**Top Secret** 

16 August 1974

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
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#### GREECE-TURKEY-CYPRUS

Indications are that the Cyprus dispute can soon be transferred from the battlefield back to the conference table. Turkish forces are close to achieving their military objectives, and there are strong signs that political leaders in Nicosia as well as in Athens have begun to face the realities of the situation.

In Cyprus, Greek Cypriot leader Glafkos Clerides invited leading members of the Greek Cypriot community to a meeting yesterday to discuss alternate courses of action. Clerides told Ambassador Davies that he took the position that the harsh facts cannot be avoided and that negotiations with the Turks must be resumed. Most of the participants, according to Clerides, were sullenly silent. Only church representatives, a few maverick leftists, and former Makarios adviser Vassos Lyssaridis spoke out in favor of continuing the fighting. The embassy's impression is that those at the meeting generally agreed to let Clerides make the final decision and assume responsibility for any adverse consequences.

Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis said in a public speech last night that Greek military opposition to Turkish aggression on Cyprus was impossible because of the distances involved and the risk of weakening the defenses of the homeland. Karamanlis said he had brought the great powers face to face with their responsibilities, however, by demanding a UN Security Council meeting and by announcing the withdrawal of Greek military forces from NATO. The Prime Minister claimed that "other action has been taken, and is being taken, which at the present moment cannot be disclosed."

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How the Greek and Greek Cypriot negotiating position will develop in the next few days is unclear. The embassy in Nicosia believes that the Greek Cypriots will soon accept a cease-fire. Although privately recognizing-along with Karamanlis--that the Turks have the upper hand, Clerides has publicly denied that he will relinquish control of one third of Cyprus to Turkey.

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#### The Military Situation

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The Turks have achieved most of their aims during the recent offensive. They have linked up with the Turkish Cypriot community in Famagusta and have reached the coast north of the city. Most of the Greek community in Famagusta has fled and the National Guard contingent reportedly is on the verge of surrendering.

The Turks are now consolidating their positions east of Nicosia, and further advances today would be aimed at solidifying their hold on the northeastern portion of the island.

The territory around Nicosia airport is still contested. A Turkish air strike this morning indicates that the Turks are continuing their efforts to surround the airfield.

The Turkish Cypriot radio today claims that a drive to the west is under way. For the last two days, this area has primarily been the scene of Greek National Guard attacks on isolated Turkish Cypriot communities. The Turks are continuing to resupply these embattled communities and to attack National Guard units from the air. Sporadic firing across the green line in Nicosia continued late into the evening. Following a short lull, the firing resumed at dawn.

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#### Reaction

Greek extreme leftist leader Papandreou yesterday told journalists in Toronto that he intends to return to Greece "immediately." Papandreou can be expected to exploit the anti-US and anti-NATO sentiment that has mush-roomed in Greece over the past four weeks. One leftist paper in Athens yesterday attributed the Greek government's decision to sever military ties with NATO to the "American-directed" attack by Turkey on Cyprus.

Soviet treatment of the Cyprus situation remains cautious. The Soviet government has yet to make an official statement on the renewed fighting. Yesterday's media treatment hailed Greece's military withdrawal from NATO, and claimed that events had proven the worthlessness of the guarantees of Cyprus' independence. Implicit in the media's treatment is support for a greater UN role as a means for Moscow to acquire some say in any future guarantees for Cyprus.

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#### SOUTH KOREA

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The gunman who attempted to assassinate South Korean President Pak Chong-hui yesterday--and killed his 47-year-old wife instead--has been identified as a Korean resident of Japan, born in Osaka, and only recently arrived in Seoul.

Police checks in Japan indicate that the 23-year-old gunman is a member of the "League of Young Korean Residents in Japan," one of many groups active among Japan's 600,000 residents of Korean extraction. The league has been identified, though not conclusively, as an affiliate of the powerful Pyongyang-dominated Chosen Soren grouping of Korean residents in Japan.

Only slightly wounded while being captured in the auditorium where President Pak was speaking

If it is determined that the gunman acted as part of a Communist-inspired conspiracy to get rid of Pak, North-South relations, already under severe strain, will almost certainly worsen. In any case, the South Korean government will probably bolster its case for tighter internal security by publicizing the events as evidence of a persistent Communist threat to governmental stability.

The attempt to kill Pak will have other important political effects. Leaders of the non-Communist opposition will probably feel compelled--out of respect for the President's wife, if not out of fear of the consequences--to calm their supporters and forgo anti-government demonstrations, at least for many weeks. In this connection, however, the loss of Mrs. Pak, an active supporter of charitable causes who has sometimes served as the President's link to Christian dissidents, may add to the longer term strains in the government's relations with the Christian leadership.

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The "Japanese connection" in the case will, of course, affect South Korean relations with Japan. The most immediate result will be to stifle the Tokyo government's persistent effort to secure diplomatic satisfaction from Seoul on a variety of grievances related to Pak's continuing campaign to repress dissent at home. The Japanese public, moreover, may be more inclined than before to credit Pak's warnings of anti-South Korean plots hatched on Japanese soil.

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#### LIBYA

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The recent withdrawal of the Egyptian military mission from Libya has prompted Tripoli immediately to seek additional foreign assistance and to recall some military officers who were retired or sent abroad after the coup in 1969.


Libya's oil wealth has enabled it to acquire large numbers of sophisticated weapons, but the government has failed to provide the training necessary to use them. The recall of senior Libyan officers removed from command in 1969 as political risks will help alleviate the problems caused by the Egyptian withdrawal. The extent to which this is helpful will depend on the number recalled, the positions to which they are assigned, and the ability of the officers themselves.

The Qadhafi regime may be taking some political risks, as these officers were associated with the old regime and therefore were held to be suspect.

In any case, most of the officers and men in the Libyan armed forces are glad to see the unpopular Egyptians leave. There is a general feeling that the withdrawal will not cause the military any serious problems.

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CHINA

The anti-Confucius campaign has been in a lull for the past few weeks as earlier strictures issued by Peking to limit criticism of officials in wall posters and to engage the population in apolitical activities take effect down the chain of command. Few new posters have appeared either in Peking or in the provinces; most have been removed, and those that remain are faded and tattered. The posters no longer attract the crowds they did last spring.

Propaganda is exhorting the people to concentrate on production and, more recently, to take part in the annual health campaign. Peking has been especially concerned about the attitude of factory workers, who were taking advantage of the unsettled political situation to agitate for higher wages and to slow the pace of production.

With the political situation relatively quiet for the first time in months, Peking's rumor mill has turned—as it has every summer for the past five years—to the prospects for convening the long overdue National People's Congress, China's rubberstamp legislature. The congress ratifies decisions made by the party leadership on government matters, such as the appointment of government ministers, a new state constitution, and long—range economic plans. The latest rumor is that Peking has finished reviewing a draft of a new constitution and that the congress may be held in September. On at least two occasions in recent years, firm plans to hold the congress were dropped because of internal problems. The anti-Confucius campaign could well dis—rupt any plans to hold the congress this year.

Rumors about the health of Premier Chou En-lai are also making the diplomatic rounds in Peking. An earlier rumor that Chou had been hospitalized again was discredited when the Premier appeared publicly on July 31, but the story has resurfaced. The Premier, who was very ill in June, has cut back sharply on his public appearances. His absences from view are likely to spark continuing rumors that he is back in the hospital. Officials who meet with foreign visitors have apologized for

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
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Chou's inability to see them, explaining that the Premier is ill and under doctors' orders not to attend many meetings.

The Premier is known to favor the orderly progression of the anti-Confucius campaign. The current lull may be seen as an indication that Chou's political influence has not diminished.

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#### ETHIOPIA

The political position of Emperor Haile Selassie continues to erode, and a series of actions by the Armed Forces Coordinating Committee (AFCC) have further isolated him and reduced his power to influence events. This week, the committee arrested two of his closest aides who had taken refuge in the imperial palace, and then it broadcast a statement that the "imperial household must not be used as a refuge for rogues."

On August 14, the AFCC announced plans to take over the Ministry of Ten, the group through which the Emperor exercised influence over cabinet decisions.

In addition, the release last week of the draft constitution formalizes his figure-head status.

In spite of his loss of power, however, he is still revered throughout much of Ethiopia, a fact clearly recognized by the committee. It will likely permit him to retain the title as long as his health permits.

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#### FOR THE RECORD

Romania-USSR: Bucharest has turned down repeated Soviet requests to allow Premier Kosygin to speak when he attends Romania's 30th anniversary celebration on August 23. Romanian President Ceausescu and his advisers may be concerned that at least a part of Kosygin's address would run counter to Bucharest's policies. The refusal is consistent with Bucharest's traditional efforts to prevent its Warsaw Pact allies from disseminating politically unacceptable material in Romania. In 1966, Bucharest also kept Chinese Premier Chou En-lai from making a public speech because it feared he would make anti-Soviet remarks.

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Iran: Early this month four British-built, missile-equipped destroyer escorts of the Iranian navy departed on a three-week cruise which will include a joint naval exercise with the Pakistani navy and a port visit to Karachi. This is the first time Iran has dispatched a task force of this size for an extended period-a reflection of Iran's growing confidence in its naval power. The task force, commanded by a nephew of the Shah, points up Iran's intention to expand its military influence in the Indian Ocean.

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Brazil-China: Brazil and China announced the establishment of diplomatic relations in Brasilia yesterday, at the conclusion of a visit by Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Chen Chien. The Brazilians now will end their diplomatic ties with Taiwan, but the two countries will want to maintain some trade relations.

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